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Jurisdictional Statement
The court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(c) and § 78-3a-909(l),
both of which confer jurisdiction over appealsfromjuvenile court orders.
Issues for Review
1.

Did the court abuse its contempt power?

2.

Did the court follow the appropriate and necessary procedures in making its

contempt determination?
3.

Did the court's words or actions on or after May 11, 2004 prohibit the court

from issuing a contempt order on May 21, 2004?
Standards of Review
A trial court's exercise of contempt is reviewed for capricious and arbitrary action or
clear abuse of discretion.
"We review a trial court's exercise of its contempt power to determine whether it
exceeded the scope of its lawful discretion

In the absence of any action by the trial court

which is so unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of
discretion, we will not overturn the trial court's order." Shipman v. Evans. 2004 UT 44,
139,100 P.3d 1151.

1

Statement of the Case
1.

Appellant David Weiskopf is a deputy county attorney.

Mr. Weiskopf

represented the state in a juvenile court certification hearing on Ma>

1

2.

. • led I

Il In

admission of an exhibit. R. H I , F . / 1 , line 13. Mr. Weiskopf provided argument about why
the exhibit should be admitted. R. 47, p. 71 "
admissibility of the evidence.

After the court made its ruling, Mr

Weiskopi
3.

The court sustained the objection to the

• *.
The court affirmed its ruling. R. 47, p. 75, line 14. Mr. Weiskopf then stated

as follows: "The State denotes that in stark contrast and plain language and the definition in
the code and the Court has already shown hostility toward prosecution andv
llicy arc I r> IIIJL* to k« 'i pin idem cunl llihil's i Icii'ly pnn mini lin in the law (sir
lines 15-19.
4.

In response to Mr. Weiskopf s statements, the court stated: "Mr. Weiskopf,

your statements are inappropriate. The next time that you argue < ith n in i i ilings after f < e
will find i oi i in contempt of <
p. 75, lines 20-23.

2

m directing you not to do that." R..47,

5.

Mr. Weiskopf then asked for a continuance of the certification hearing in order

to pursue an appeal. The court denied the request. Mr. Weiskopf then requested a recess and
the court granted a ten minute break. R. 47, p. 75-76.
6.

During the recess, the judge and the attorneys met in the judge's chambers to

discuss the case. Apparently a controversy arose during that meeting. When the judge and
attorneys returned to the courtroom, the judge's and the attorneys' understanding and
perspective of the facts related to the meeting were recited for the record. The judge first
described the incidents as follows: "I'm going to make a record of a discussion that we had
in chambers just a few moments ago. Counsel had requested to speak with the Court in
chambers and had the attorneys, Mr. Weiskopf for the state, Ms. Sipes for Jeffrey Ortega, and
Ms. Clark for Javier Cisneros in my chambers. There was a question raised by Mr. Weiskopf
regarding the ruling the court had just made and how it might impact future evidence that he
intends to offer and after hearing what he had to say, I indicated that I was not going to reargue the motion or the ruling there in the chambers and Mr. Weiskopf started bringing up
the issue again. I repeated that I was not going to argue the issue there and he started
bringing it up again and then I raised my voice and said I'm not going to argue it at this point.
He then turned to me and said, 'I haven't screamed at you, Judge, but you've now screamed
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at me twice,' and then he said 'Judge, I've had it.' And then he repeated, 'I've had it'
addressing those remarks to the Court." R. 47, p. 76, lines 17-25, and p. 77, lines 1-9.
7.

After the judge's statement, the court invited counsel to recite their

understanding of the events on the record. Mr. Weiskopf stated as follows: "when I brought
up the issue of similar evidence, you said that we were free to try and work out a stipulation
but you weren't going to rehear an argument which recognized that we were doing more than
really hearing an argument. I was trying to address with counsel and the Court an
arrangement with respect to a similar kind of evidence. So it wasn't my just directing reargument toward you and you specifically acknowledged that by addressing that I was
bringing up a new issue of evidence that could be spoken about and then characterized it as
arguing and kept saying you weren't going to reargue, the two times like you said and then
I tried to bring your attention back to this and you screamed at me and then you got up and
approached me in an angry manner and continued to scream at me and then I turned at you
and said 'You've screamed at me twice today, the other time being when the defense counsel
was almost an hour late and I simply said I want to make a record that this is not fair, I'm
unhappy. I do not recall - does anyone recall being told this hearing may be delayed? It's
not fair to the witnesses, it's not fair to the victim.' And you screamed at me, 'Well what am

4

I suppose to do about it' or something like that." R. 47, p. 77, lines 16-25, and p. 78, lines
1-11.
In the latter portion of this statement, Mr. Weiskopf was referring to earlier in the day,
when the hearing was delayed because one of the attorneys was late. R. 47, p. 1, lines 21-24.
8.

Ms. Jennifer Clark provided her version of the events as follows: "I was

present at that initial hearing when [inaudible] we just came in and we were discussing the
time of the hearing and Mr. Weiskopf said he was just concerned, he wasn't going to ask for
sanctions, he just had a concern that there was the delay. There was no screaming by the
bench. All the judge said is, 'Yes, it may be unfair but, you know, what can I do about it?'
That was it. In the chambers there was no screaming by the Judge. There was a time when
the Judge, as indicated, raised his voice but there was no -1 heard no screaming, nor did I see
the Judge go toward -1 mean he was walking out as we all walking out (sic) but I didn't see
any movement by Judge Andrus toward Mr. Weiskopf." R. 47, p. 78, lines 13-25, and p. 79,
line 1.
9.

Ms. Sharon Sipes then provided her version of the events: "Your Honor, may

I just state that it was my fault and I acknowledged that it was my fault that there was a delay
in the trial starting today. I had a matter in the district court that went longer than I had
anticipated and I apologized for that. I apologized to Mr. Weiskopf and to his witnesses and
5

the people he brought along with him. I, as well, was present during that hearing. The
second incident that we were talking about in chambers, I don't know how the Court could
have gotten out of the room without walking around its desk. Mr. Weiskopf, what I saw was
standing to the side of the desk that the Court had to walk around in order to get out of the
room and I certainly would not characterize the Court's actions as going towards or leading
towards Mr. Weiskopf or screaming or yelling at him." R. 47, p. 79, lines 13-25, and p. 80,
line 1.
10.

After the attorneys and the court had recited their understanding of the events

that had occurred in chambers, and the earlier event before the hearing started, the court
stated as follows: "Now, I am going to warn you again, Mr. Weiskopf, it was very
inappropriate when you made the last statement to the court directly, Tve had it' and then
repeated that and I find that that is contemptible. I'm not finding you in contempt of court
at this time - but I just will not put up with that. I realize these matters are emotional and the
court may make correct or incorrect rulings and it's the duty of counsel to take the rulings
and move on." R. 47, p. 80, lines 2-11.
11.

At the conclusion of the first day of the certification hearings, the court

generated a document entitled "Minutes, Findings and Order." A copy this document is
attached as Addendum "B." R. 40. The document was signed by Judge Mark Andrus. The
6

Minutes, Findings and Order provided a recitation of the events during the certification
hearing. Included within the minutes was the following: "The court has had discussion in
chambers with counsel. There was a question by Mr. Weiskopf regarding the ruling the court
had made. The court indicated that it would not re-argue the issue. Mr. Weiskopf got upset
repeating Tve had it' 'I've had it'. The court does find Attorney Weiskopf s conduct was
contemptable (sic), but does not find him in contempt." R. 40. The order portion of the
document stated that the certification hearing would be continued to May 21,2004. R. 40.
12.

On May 21,2004, the certification hearing continued. At the conclusion of the

evidence, the court stated: "I have regarding my ruling on May 11th when we were here last
time, Mr. Weiskopf, where I decided not to find you in contempt of court I changed my mind.
I am finding you in contempt of court for that. I want to set a sentencing date for that as
well." R. 47, p. 267, lines 13-17.
13.

On the same date, the court issued contempt findings and a contempt order.

A copy of the document is attached as Addendum "A." R. 35-38. The court found Mr.
Weiskopf in contempt for four reasons: "repeatedly and rudely interrupting the Court while
it was attempting to explain its rulings," "violating the Court's order not to argue with the
Court's rulings," "behavior in the Court's chambers: continuing to argue with the Court,
falsely accusing the Court of screaming at him, and making the angry statement, * Judge, I've
7

had it. I've had it,'" and "falsely accusing the Court inappropriate behavior [sic], in an
attempt to cast the Court in a bad light and in an attempt to excuse or mitigate his own
inappropriate behavior." R. 37.
14.

In the May 21 order, the court recognized that it "had initially indicated orally

that it would not find contempt of court at that time, even though Mr, Weiskopf s behavior
would support such a finding." R. 38. The court further stated that "Mr. Weiskopf has
engaged in contemptible behavior in the p a s t . . . [but] the Court has confined itself in the
past to instructing Mr. Weiskopf on proper courtroom behavior, directing him not to repeat
inappropriate behavior, warning him that he would be found in contempt if such behavior
was repeated and meeting with his employer and supervisor to address the problem. Upon
reflecting upon the matter away from the heat of the moment, this Court recognized that
those other attempts to address Mr. Weiskopf s inappropriate behavior have been
unsuccessful, that it is incumbent upon this Court to address this matter more directly, and
that it is appropriate and necessary to invoke the Court's contempt power." R. 38.
15.

On May 26,2004, the court conducted a sentencing hearing for the contempt.

The court offered Mr. Weiskopf an opportunity to speak, but Mr. Weiskopf did not say
anything at that time. R. 48, p. 2, lines 6-11.
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16.

In determining the sentence to impose, the court considered "past behaviors of

inappropriate behavior before this court." R. 48, p. 2, lines 14-23. The court sentenced Mr.
Weiskopf to 30 days in jail, with a $1000.00 fine. The court suspended 28 days in jail and
$800.00 of the fine.. R. 48, p. 3, lines 13-17.
17.

Mr. Weiskopf filed a Motion to Reconsider and to Stay the Sentence. The

court denied the motion to reconsider in a ruling dated June 10,2004. A copy of this ruling
is attached as Addendum "C." R. 26-27. The court determined that its May 11 minute entry
was not a final adjudication on the contempt and that his statement during the hearing that
it would not find Mr. Weiskopf in contempt "at this time" meant that the court would
continue to consider the issue. R. 26. The court also determined that it had the authority to
summarily address contempt committed in the presence of the court. R. 26.
18.

A notice of appeal was filed on June 11, 2004. R. 25.

Summary of Argument
The following argument follows the chronology of the contempt proceedings to show
that, at each step, the court followed the contempt statutes and provided the Appellant with
the appropriate notice and opportunity to be heard. The trial court's order against the
Appellant involved direct criminal contempt. The court followed Title 78, Chapter 32 of the
Utah Code, which allows a court to summarily address contempt committed in the presence
9

of a judge. The trial court also considered the Appellant's due process rights. The court
specifically warned the Appellant of expectations and the consequences of failing to meet
those expectations. The court provided the Appellant with an opportunity to meet
expectations, and the court provided the Appellant with an opportunity to explain why he did
not meet the expectations.
The Appellant's actions constituted contempt because he violated a court order to
refrain from excessive arguing and he directly challenged the integrity and authority of the
court. The actions interrupted the court proceedings.
The ultimate issue in this case is the effect of the trial court's words and actions
related to: 1) the oral and written statement that the Appellant's actions were contemptible;
2) the oral statement that the Appellant would not be held in contempt "at this time"; 3) the
minute entry which stated that the court did not find Appellant in contempt; and 4) the
subsequent contempt order issued at the end of the certification hearing. The court was
permitted to delay a final contempt ruling until the end of the certification hearing. The
court's words and actions indicate that the court was reserving final judgment on the
contempt. Because the facts supporting contempt had already been established, and because
the court's minute entry was not a final determination of the contempt, the court was
permitted to issue a contempt order on May 21.
10

Argument
1.

The trial court properly applied the s.. tutory procedures related to direct
contempt
Title 78, Chapter 32 of the Utah Code contains the statutory provisions on

contempt. There are two types of contempt proceedings - direct and indirect - and two types
of contempt sanctions - civil and criminal. This results in four contempt possibilities:
indirect civil, indirect criminal, direct civil, and direct criminal. See e.g. Khan v. Khan. 921
P.2d 466 (Utah App. 1996). Indirect contempt is that which occurs outside of the presence
of a judge. Id, at 468. Direct contempt occurs in the presence of a judge. I d The difference
between civil and criminal contempt lies in the purpose for which a sanction is imposed.
Von Hake v. Thomas. 759 P.2d 1152, 1168 (Utah 1988). ("[I]t is the purpose, not the
method of punishment, that serves to distinguish [civil and criminal contempt].") This case
involves direct criminal contempt, as the acts occurred in the presence of the judge and the
sentence was designed to punish behavior and vindicate the court's authority. Von Hake.
759 P.2d at 1168. ("A contempt order is criminal if its purpose is to vindicate the court's
authority, as by punishing an individual for disobeying an order.")
Title 78, Chapter 32 is divided in a manner that recognizes the distinctions between
direct and indirect contempt, and criminal and civil contempt. Section 78-32-1 describes the

11

acts or omissions which may constitute contempt. This statute applies in all cases. Section
78-32-3 states that "when a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of
the court, or judge at chambers, it maybe punished summarily

" This statute recognizes

and applies to instances of direct contempt. Sections 78-32-4 to 78-32-10 describe the
procedures to be followed "when the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and
presence of the court or judge." § 78-32-4. These are the procedures that must be followed
for indirect contempt. Section 78-32-10 describes the contempt penalties that may be
imposed after both direct and indirect contempt proceedings. The section authorizes criminal
contempt sanctions. Section 78-32-12 states that a contemnor may be imprisoned until a
specific act is performed. This is the statute that generally applies in civil contempt matters.
Based on the above, the statutes that apply in this case are § 78-32-1, § 78-32-3, and § 7832-10.
Section 78-32-3 states that when contempt is committed in the presence of the court
"it may be punished summarily." The Appellant has not contested that the acts upon which
the court relied in finding contempt all occurred in the presence of the judge. Because the
acts occurred in the presence of the judge, the statute permitted the judge to summarily
punish the contempt.

12

Despite the fact that the acts involved direct contempt, the Appellant argues that the
judge should have handled the case as if it were indirect contempt, and conduct a separate
hearing. However, there is nothing in the statutory scheme that requires, or perhaps even
permits, a judge to convert direct contempt into an indirect contempt proceeding.
The Appellant has cited case law in support of his argument that a hearing was
required. However, each of the cited cases involved indirect contempt. The Appellant has
not cited any cases requiring a separate hearing for direct contempt. In Von Hake, the court
stated that "due process requirements are satisfied in a summary proceeding for direct
contempt because the judge has personally witnessed the acts constituting contempt and the
person committing the contempt has full knowledge of the nature of the contempt charge and
an opportunity to defend against the charge." Id. at 1170. The contempt statutes authorize
summary proceedings, recognizing that due process is satisfied when the judge personally
observes the contumacious acts.
The due process and summary punishment aspects of this case will be discussed in
more detail below. Some of the discussions in those sections are relevant to the procedures
outlined in the statutes. The important consideration at this point is that the trial court's
actions were consistent with the statutory procedures.

13

It is also important at this point to recognize that there are practical reasons why a
judge does not need to convert direct contempt into an indirect proceeding. When contempt
occurs in the presence of the judge, the judge personally observes and evaluates the
contumacious acts. Requiring the judge to conduct a hearing to review what the judge has
already observed seems unnecessary. Requiring the court to conduct an adversary hearing
would place the judge in the difficult position of being called as a witness. These are
practical difficulties that mitigate against conducting a separate hearing for acts that
constitute direct contempt. Because indirect contempt occurs outside of the judge's presence,
a hearing is necessary to present evidence to the judge. Direct contempt does not include the
same need to prove facts, because the judge has already personally witnessed the events.
When the contemptuous acts occur in the presence of the judge, the contempt may be
addressed summarily without conducting an additional hearing or review.
2.

The court did not violate the Appellant's due process rights.
One of the significant focuses in a contempt matter is whether the contemnor's due

process rights were satisfied. Direct contempt is allowed to be summarily punished because
the contemnor "has full knowledge of the nature of the contempt." Von Hake. 759 P.2d at
1170. The knowledge may be gained through a specific order or warning from the court or
from established and expected norms, such as obligations established in an attorney's Rules
14

of Professional Conduct. See State v. Long. 844 P.2d 3 81.3 85 OJtah App. 1992)("[N]eglect
or violation of an ethical duty will support a criminal contempt conviction . . . if the ethical
impropriety also impinges upon the integrity of the court.") Direct contempt may be dealt
with summarily when the alleged contemnor has notice of expected behavior and an
opportunity to comply with expectations. If the expectations are not met, the due process
rights of a contemnor are further protected when the individual has an opportunity to explain
why the expectations were not met. In this case, the trial court provided sufficient due
process.
Mr. Weiskopf was aware of the nature of the contempt. For example, the court
specifically warned Mr. Weiskopf against continuing to argue about the court's rulings. The
court stated "the next time that you argue with my rulings after I have made a ruling, I will
find you in contempt of court. I am directing you not to do that." The court not only warned
Mr. Weiskopf against excessive arguments, the court specifically stated that future violations
would result in contempt. As an attorney, Mr. Weiskopf was also aware of his obligations
under the Rules of Professional Conduct. See e ^ Rule 3.5, Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct. ("A lawyer shall n o t . . . engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.") Mr.
Weiskopf was therefore aware of expected behavior. He had notice. He also had an
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opportunity to comply with the expected behavior. Mr. Weiskopf had full knowledge of the
nature of the contempt, satisfying due process for a direct contempt proceeding.
The court further protected Mr. Weiskopf s due process rights when it provided Mr.
Weiskopf with an opportunity to explain why he had continued to argue the court's ruling
and to recite his understanding of the events from the in-chambers meeting. R. 47, p. 77.
The court provided Mr. Weiskopf with an opportunity to make a record of his position, and
to perhaps dissuade the court from entering a contempt order.
The court provided the necessary notice and opportunity to be heard up to the point
at which the court determined that Mr. Weiskopf s actions were "contemptible." R. 47, p.
80, line 1. The ramifications of the events that followed will be discussed in the sections
below. The emphasis at this point is that the court provided the necessary notice and
opportunity, and could have immediately sanctioned Mr. Weiskopf s conduct during the May
11 hearing. This point is bolstered by the considerable deference accorded a trial court judge
in evaluating contempt. Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 239 (Utah 1976).
(Contempt "rest[s] within [a trial judge's] sound discretion.") A trial court judge is in the best
position to evaluate whether direct contempt has occurred. The court's decision should not
be overturned unless there is an indication that the court clearly abused its discretion, either
as to process or findings.
16

Mr. Weiskopfhas not significantly challenged the trial court's conclusions that certain
behavior occurred. He has instead claimed that the behavior did not interrupt the court
proceedings. There are several responses to this assertion. Section 78-32-1(5) considers the
following act to be contempt: "Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the
court." Unlike other provisions in § 78-32-1, this provision does not require that the
disobedience "interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding." Disobedience
of a lawful order is itself contempt. In Commonwealth v. Local Union 542, 552 F.2d 498,
509 (3rd Cir. 1977) the court stated that "flouting a trial judge's commands is the essence of
obstructing the administration ofjustice." The very fact that Appellant continued to argue
a ruling after being ordered to stop, warranted a contempt sanction.
The record also shows that Mr. Weiskopf s actions interrupted the proceeding.
Sections 78-32-1(1) & (2) state that "disorderly... or insolent behavior toward the judge"
or "boisterous conduct' may constitute contempt if the acts "interrupt the due course of a trial
or otherjudicial proceeding." The facts show that the certification hearing was delayed while
the court took time to address Mr. Weiskopf s conduct. The facts relied upon by the court
also indicate that the in-chambers meeting was interrupted by Mr. Weiskopf s arguing and
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his outburst directed toward the judge. Also, Mr. Weiskopf s explanation and attempt to
impugn the court threatened to further disrupt the certification hearing.1
The trial court strongly believes that it provided Mr. Weiskopf with adequate due
process, both under the statute and under constitutional considerations. If the court had
immediately ordered that Mr. Weiskopf was in contempt and punished him after the meeting
in chambers, then the court believes that there is little question the court would have acted
within its rights, and the Appellant's due process rights would have been satisfied. As will
be discussed below, the fact that the contempt findings were delayed does not diminish the
due process that was provided to that point. Ultimately, the primary issues in this case are
the effect of the delay between the May 11 hearing and minute entry and the May 21,2004
contempt order, and the effect of the language in the May 11 minute entry. The delay issue
will be addressed first. The court believes that the delay was permitted under both statute
and case law.
1

Section 78-32-1(3) includes as contempt: "Misbehavior in office, or other willful
neglect or violation of duty by an attorney
" Although the court did not specifically
rely on this provision in its contempt order, Mr. Weiskopf s actions could be considered a
violation of this provision. Mr. Weiskopf disobeyed a court order and then challenged the
integrity of the court by accusing the judge of threatening acts, which accusations were
countered by other attorneys. An attorney's violation of ethical duties supports a
contempt finding when the violation "also impinges upon the integrity of the court."
Long, 844 P.2d at 385. Mr. Weiskopf s accusations were a direct attack on the integrity
of the court.
18

3.

A trial court may delay issuing a contempt order until the conclusion of a trial
or hearing.
Other jurisdictions have recognized that a court is not required to immediately issue

a ruling and findings when direct contempt occurs. A contempt order may be delayed to the
completion of the underlying proceeding. In Sacher v. United States. 343 U.S. 1 (1952),
several defense attorneys had engaged in acts which constituted contempt during the course
of a trial. Id at 3. The trial judge did not punish the contempt during the trial, but waited
until the completion of the proceeding, at which time an order was issued without an
additional hearing. Id. at 6. The trial lasted nine months. IdLat3. The attorneys alleged that
the trial court's failure to act at the time of each act deprived the court of the ability to punish
the contempt summarily. Id. at 6. The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. The Court first stated
that "summary . . . does not refer to the timing of the action . . . but refers to a procedure
which dispenses with the formality, delay and digression that would result from the issuance
of process, service of complaints and answer, holding hearings [ e t c . ] . . . and all that goes
with a conventional court trial." Id. at 9. The court thus recognized that direct contempt can
be addressed through an informal process and need not coincide with the contemptuous acts.

19

The Court then stated that "if we were to hold that summary punishment can be
imposed only instantly upon the event, it would be an incentive to pronounce, while smarting
under the irritation of the contemptuous act, what should be a well-considered judgment. We
think it less likely that unfair condemnation of counsel will occur if the more deliberate
course be permitted." Id. at 11. The facts of Sacher did not clearly explain the reasons for
the delayed disposition. However, the court stated that "if the conduct of these lawyers
warranted immediate summary punishment on dozens of occasions, no possible prejudice to
them can result from delaying it until the end of the trial if the circumstances permit such
delay." I d at 10.
The principles of Sacher are important in this case. As stated by the Appellant,
contempt is a power that should be used sparingly. Although contempt can be addressed
immediately, a heat of the moment decision does not always produce the best or most desired
result. Granting a judge time to reflect on whether the contempt should be punished
promotes a well-considered decision. Delaying a decision until the end of the underlying
proceeding also protects the rights of those involved in the case by insuring that the case is
not inordinately disturbed or sidetracked by a contempt proceeding. It is possible that delay
could prejudice a contemnor. However, the delay itself is not prejudice.
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This case is similar to Sacher because the court waited until the completion of the
certification hearing before issuing the contempt order. Issuing the order immediately during
the hearing would have further disrupted the hearing. The juveniles who were the subject
of the certification hearing were entitled to a process that was as deliberate as possible,
without more disruption than had already occurred. Delaying the contempt order was
therefore reasonable. The trial court used the time after the May 11 proceeding to reflect on
what had occurred. The court could have ultimately decided against punishing the contempt,
but reflection solidified the need for action.
In making this argument, the trial court is aware of the due process considerations that
are involved in delaying a contempt order. In International Union. United Mineworkers of
America v. Bagwell. 512 U.S. 821,832 (1994), the court stated that "[s]ummary adjudication
becomes less justifiable once a court leaves the realm of immediately sanctioned, petty direct
contempts. If a court delays punishing a direct contempt until the completion of trial, for
example, due process requires that the contemnor's rights to a notice and a hearing be
respected." This language requires a court to be more careful that it has satisfied due process
in situations in which a summary contempt order is delayed. The language does not require
that a subsequent hearing be held. The language only requires a court to consider the due
process that has been provided and offer additional process if necessary.
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The Bagwell court cited Tavlor v. Haves, 418 U.S. 488 (1974), in making its
statement. The Hayes court had cited and recognized Sacher, but did not overrule Sacher's
conclusions. The Hayes court recognized that the contemnors in Sacher "were given an
opportunity to speak and the trial judge would, no doubt, have modified his action had their
statements proved persuasive.'5 Id. at 498.
Under this precedent, a trial court judge may delay the imposition of summary
contempt. If there is delay, the court must be circumspect about whether the contemnor was
provided with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard at the time of the contemptuous
acts. If there is a question about whether adequate due process was provided, the court
should perhaps provide another opportunity to be heard before issuing a contempt order.
This type of evaluation should be left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.
In this case, the delay between the May 11 hearing and the May 21 contempt order
was permissible. The delay was tied to the continuation of the certification hearing. The
court was satisfied that Mr. Weiskopfhad received adequate notice of expected behavior and
an opportunity to both avoid the behavior and explain the behavior that had occurred. An
additional hearing to review the facts would not have changed those facts or whether the
facts constituted contempt. Furthermore, at the May 26, 2004 hearing, the court provided
Mr. Weiskopf with an additional opportunity to address the matter before punishment was
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imposed. Mr. Weiskopf could have used this opportunity to again be heard on the acts. Mr.
Weiskopf could have explained his actions, apologized, or provided other clarifications. As
in Sacher, Mr. Weiskopf could have used this time to persuade the court against its intended
action. Mr. Weiskopf chose not to use this opportunity. The court provided sufficient due
process and acted within the bounds of state and U.S. Supreme Court precedent in delaying
its contempt order.
If this court were to determine that adequate due process was not provided to Mr.
Weiskopf then the issue of an appropriate remedy would arise. The trial court believes that
conducting an additional hearing in this matter would accomplish nothing. The facts upon
which the contempt was based are established in the record, as is Mr. Weiskopf s position
on the facts. Mr. Weiskopf has been provided several opportunities to avoid or explain his
conduct. Nothing would be accomplished by an additional hearing and this is indicative that
due process has been provided.
4.

The court's May 11 minute entry did not constitute an acquittal.
Ultimately, this case comes down to whether the court was foreclosed from issuing

a contempt order subsequent to the May 11 hearing. If the words or actions of the court in
the hearing and minute entry constituted final action, then the contempt order should be set
aside. The trial court does not believe, however, that this is the case.
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In Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 654 (Utah 1994), the court stated that
"[i]t is settled law that a trial court is free to reassess its decision at any point prior to entry
of a final order or judgment." The court also stated that "[i]t is well-settled that an unsigned
minute entry does not constitute an entry ofjudgment, nor is it a final judgment for purposes
of appeal" LdL at 653. In State v. Leatherburv. 2003 UT 2, ^ 9, 65 P.3d 1180, the court
stated that "[a] signed minute entry will not be considered a final order where its language
indicates that it is not intended as final."
The certification hearing was held on two different days - May 11 and May 21. The
acts constituting contempt occurred on May 11. During the May 11 proceeding, the court
warned Mr. Weiskopf that if he again argued his ruling, "I will find you in contempt of
court/' R. 47, p.75. After the in-chambers meeting, the court specifically found that Mr.
Weiskopf s acts were "contemptible." The court expressly determined that Mr. Weiskopf s
acts constituted contempt. The court then stated that it was not finding Mr. Weiskopf in
contempt "at this time." Because the certification hearing was not complete, it was the
court's intention to delay a final decision on contempt until the conclusion of the hearing.
The only thing that was "ordered" in the May 11 Minutes, Findings and Order was that the
certification hearing be continued to May 21. The court did not issue a final order on the
contempt matter. The court's language about not finding Mr. Weiskopf in contempt was in
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the "minutes" portion of the May 11 document. This is evidenced by the fact that the
language is found within other language that is usually reserved for minute entries.2 Even
if this court were to consider the May 11 document as a signed minute entry, the court's
statement during the certification hearing indicates that the signed minute entry was not
intended to be the final judgment on the issue.
The trial court's decision to carefully consider the contempt order, rather than acting
quickly and rashly during the certification hearing, should be recognized and approved. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-32-3 states that "when direct contempt occurs, it may be punished
summarily, for which an order must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in such
immediate view and presence." A direct contempt finding requires consideration of the facts
upon which the contempt is based. An evidentiary hearing is not required because the acts
have occurred in the presence of the judge, but careful contemplation of the facts is
anticipated by the Utah Code. The court engaged in this careful consideration before issuing
its contempt order.
The Appellant argues that the minute entry was a final determination of the contempt.
At most, however, the minute entry can be considered to have created an intermediate,

2

For example, other language in this section discusses the identity of witnesses and
the marking of evidence.
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incomplete finding which the trial court subsequently clarified.

In Swenson Assocs.

Architects, P.C. v. State of Utah. 889 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1994) the court stated that "in
appropriate circumstances, a signed minute entry may be a final order

However, such

treatment is appropriate only where the ruling specifies with certainty a final determination
of the rights of the parties and is susceptible of enforcement."
The May 11 minute entry did not specify with certainty the rights of the parties, and
therefore this is not an appropriate circumstance for treating the minute entry as a final order.
On the one hand,

the trial court determined that Mr. Weiskopf s actions were

"contemptible." On the other hand, the court determined that the Appellant was not in
contempt. These two findings warranted subsequent clarification by the court. Because the
court had orally reserved further consideration of the issue by not ordering contempt "at this
time," Mr. Weiskopf would have been aware that the minute entry was not a final
determination of the issue. The May 11 minute entry should not be considered a final order.
Because the order was not final, the trial court was permitted to assess the contempt at the
conclusion of the certification hearing.
Conclusion
The trial court recognizes its duty to use contempt sparingly. However, this case
presents an appropriate use of the contempt power. As the court stated in its May 21 order,
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the court had a history of difficulties with Mr. Weiskopf. The court had previously warned
Mr. Weiskopf about his behavior and expectations. The court had also met with Mr.
Weiskopf s supervisors to address the behavior issues.

These efforts had proved

unsuccessful when the problems arose at the May 11 hearing. The facts support the court's
findings that Mr. Weiskopf was contumacious at that hearing. Mr. Weiskopf s behavior was
disruptive and a direct challenge to the authority and integrity of the court. Because the
actions occurred in the presence of the judge, statutes and case law support the trial court's
ability to summarily address the contempt. Rather than immediately address the contempt,
the court decided to complete the certification hearing and to carefully consider the events.
Although Mr. Weiskopf may have hoped that he would not be punished for his actions, he
did not have a legitimate expectation that the May 11 minute entry was a final judgment of
his actions.
Dated this 14th day of February, 2005.

Brent M. Johnson^Attorney for
Judge Mark Andnis
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Addendum "A"

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF

CONTEMPT FINDINGS

DAVID WEISKOPF,
Case No.444959
A person over 18 years of age.

David Weiskopf, as a Deputy County Attorney for the Weber County Attorney's Office,
appeared representing the State of Utah in a hearing held May 11, 2004, on the State's motions
requesting that two separate juveniles be certified to stand trial in district court (Case Nos.
135570 and 935953, respectively). Also appearing were: the two juveniles whose cases were at
bar; parents of the juveniles; Jennifer Clark, attorney for one of the juveniles; Sharon Sipes,
attorney for the other juvenile; and Patricia Smedley, another Deputy County Attorney appearing
for the State. At one point during the trial, the Court made oral findings regarding behavior of
Mr. Weiskopf, indicating that the behavior was worthy of contempt of court, but that the Court
would not make a formal finding of contempt at that time; having not previously made a final
order upon the matter, and upon further reflection and consideration of the matter, the Court
hereby issues a formal finding of contempt of court by Mr. Weiskopf.

FINDINGS
1. The hearing was scheduled to begin at 11:00 a.m., but Ms. Sipes, attorney for one of
the juveniles, was detained in district court on another matter; at noon, Ms. Clark, Mr. Weiskopf,
and Ms. Smedley, came into the courtroom to discuss the situation; Ms. Clark explained that Ms.
Sipes was still in district court and would still be a few minutes; Mr. Weiskopf then said Ms.
Sipes hadn't informed the court of any expected delays or conflicts; the Court's clerk indicated
that Ms. Sipes had mentioned she had a district court hearing, but had expected to be done in
time for this hearing.
Mr. Weiskopf then said he wanted it on record that he was veryfrustratedby this
circumstance, that the State had witnesses and was ready to proceed with the hearing, that he was
not asking for sanctions, but that he thought this was "very unfair." The Court said, "I agree with
you, Mr. Weiskopf. It is unfair, but I don't know what to do about it." (The Court's voice was at
a normal conversational level, not raised at all, and the Court's tone of voice was one of
sympathy towards Mr. Weiskopf s position.) Mr. Weiskopf then said, "I don't know what to do
about it, either." Court then indicated it would take a lunch break at that time and reconvene
court at 1:00 p.m., trusting that Ms. Sipes would be back and ready to go by that time, which she
was.

WEISKOPF, David
Page 2

2. During the course of the certification hearing, while the Court was explaining its
ruling on an evidentiary objection, Mr. Weiskopf rudely interrupted the Court, then re-argued the
matter, criticizing the Court's ruling; after the Court reiterated that it had made its ruling, Mr.
Weiskopf again criticized the ruling, stating that the Court had "already shown hostility towards
the prosecution"; the Court had not been hostile towards the state, nor were there any grounds for
concluding so.
3. At that point the Court advised Mr. Weiskopf that his behavior was inappropriate; the
Court directed Mr. Weiskopf that he was not to continue arguing with or criticizing court
decisions after a ruling had been made, and that if he did so, he would be found in contempt of
court; Mr. Weiskopf then interrupted the Court while it was making that statement, and a
sentence or two later, after asking the Court for an explanation of its ruling, interrupted the Court
again.
4. The Court then took a recess; during the recess, Mr. Weiskopf requested a conference
in chambers with counsel, which was granted; Mr. Weiskopf, along with Ms. Sipes and Ms.
Clark, met with the court in the Court's chambers. Once in chambers, Mr. Weiskopf referred to
the ruling made by the Court just before the recess (the Court had refused to admit the written
statement of a witness who was not present), and indicated that this ruling would impact the
State's plan to introduce several other documents (such as medical or doctors' statements) into
evidence without having the authors of the documents present; Mr. Weiskopf said he just wanted
to know what to do in dealing with the introduction of that evidence; Mr. Weiskopf then began
stating why he felt that that type of evidence should be admitted. The Court indicated that it had
made its ruling and that the matter would not be re-argued in chambers.
Mr. Weiskopf said he just wanted to deal with the forthcoming evidence, then turned to
Ms. Sipes and Ms. Clark, saying he didn't know if they wanted to stipulate to that evidence
coming in, or what; he then began talking again about why that evidence should be admissible in
this kind of a hearing. The Court then indicated that the issue of stipulating to evidence or not
was a matter the attorneys should discuss amongst themselves, not before the Court, and repeated
that the Court would not re-argue the prior ruling.
Mr. Weiskopf then began talking about the ruling again, as all four persons were getting
up to leave the room; while getting up from its desk, the Court raised its voice and repeated that
it would not allow re-argument of the ruling and that the attorneys needed to go into the
courtroom. At that point Mr. Weiskopf was holding the door open as the other two lawyers
walked out and the Court, behind its desk and furthest from the door, was also heading around
the desk and towards the door.
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Mr. Weiskopf, still holding the door, turned back to face the Court as it approached the
door, saying angrily, "Judge, that's two times you've screamed at me today. I haven't raised my
voice at you at all, but you've screamed at me twice." The Court then gestured with an open
palm towards the open door and quietly said, "Please leave my chambers now." Mr. Weiskopf
started out the door, but looking back at the Court, said angrily, "Judge, I've had it. I've had it."
The Court kept walking, passing Mr. Weiskopf at the threshold of the door, saying, "Okay, we'll
go put this on the record now." All four went into the courtroom.
5. On the record Mr. Weiskopf claimed that the Court had screamed at him, both earlier
in the day (referring to the incident described in paragraph #1 above, claiming that the Court had
screamed at him, "Well, what do you want me to do about it?") and in chambers; he also claimed
that, after screaming at him in chambers, the Court had advanced towards him in an angry
manner and screamed at him again. None of those claims were true, and all were disputed on the
record by the Court and by the others who were present.
6. The Court finds Mr. Weiskopf in contempt of court for:
- repeatedly and rudely interrupting the Court while it was attempting to explain
its rulings;
- violating the Court's order not to argue with the Court's rulings;
- his behavior in the Court's chambers: continuing to argue with the Court, falsely
accusing the Court of screaming at him, and making the angry statement, "Judge, I've had
it. I've had it." These were attempts to get the Court to change a prior ruling through
verbal intimidation; and
- falsely accusing the Court inappropriate behavior, in an attempt to cast the Court
in a bad light and in an attempt to excuse or mitigate his own inappropriate behavior
(claiming that the Court was hostile towards the State, that the Court had screamed at him
before the hearing began, that the Court had screamed at him in chambers, and claiming
that the Court had advanced towards him in an angry manner and screamed at him again).
The Court finds that this conduct constituted contempt of court pursuant to Utah Code Section
78-32-1(1) and (2) as disorderly, contemptuous, insolent, or boisterous conduct which tended to
interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding, and that, pursuant to Utah Code
Section 78-32-1(5), he disobeyed the Court's order not to argue with or criticize with court
rulings once they had been made.

WEISKOPF, David
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7. The Court had initially indicated orally that it would not find contempt of court at that
time, even though Mr. Weiskopf s behavior would support such a finding; this was pursuant to
and consistent with this Court's long practice of not taking the matter of contempt of court
lightly, of being very leery of using the contempt power as a means of disciplining attorneys for
courtroom behavior, and particularly of making such decisions in the heat of an emotional
moment, choosing rather to err on the side of restraint until further deliberation is possible;
although Mr. Weiskopf has engaged in contemptible behavior in the past, including a pattern of
rudely interrupting the court while it is making rulings, as well as arguing and criticizing, in a
very disrespectful manner, court rulings while and after they are made, this Court has confined
itself in the past to instructing Mr. Weiskopf on proper courtroom behavior, directing him not to
repeat inappropriate behavior, warning him that he would be found in contempt if such behavior
was repeated, and meeting with his employer and supervisor to address the problem.
Upon reflecting upon the matter away from the heat of the moment, this Court recognized
that those other attempts to address Mr. Weiskopf s inappropriate behavior have been
unsuccessful, that it is incumbent upon this Court to address the matter more directly, and that it
is appropriate and necessary to invoke the Court's contempt power; for these reasons the Court
has determined to enter these formal findings of contempt of court at this time.

ORDER
This matter is set for sentencing on the contempt for Wednesday, May 26,2004, at 9:00
a.m before this Court. Mr. Weiskopf is to be present in court at that time. The clerk is to provide
a copy of these Findings to Mr. Weiskopf and to Mark Decaria, Weber County Attorney.
DATED THIS 21 S T DAY OF MAY, 2004.
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BY THE COURT

cc: David Weiskopf; Mark Decaria
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Addendum "B"

SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of

MINUTES, FINDINGS AND ORDER
Case Number:935953

ORTEGA, Jeffrey
A person under 18 years of age

CD:13; 1:08; R:3 PL

Present: Jeffrey Ortega, minor; Rosalva Uribe, mother; Sharon Sipes, attorney for minor;
Cristina Bernal, interpreter; David Weiskopf and Tricia Smedley, deputy county attorney; witnesses; and
Kenny Ala probation officer
The above entitled matter having come before this court for the purpose of arraignment on
incident Oil, contempt, contained in the affidavit dated February 24, 2004, and for hearing on incident
017, attempted murder, contained in the information dated March 17, 2004 and incident 042 motion to
certify dated March 17, 2004.
Attorney Sipes and Attorney Clark ask that Mr. Guerster, a reporter, be asked to leave. Motion
is denied. Mr. Guerster is asked not to use names in his article. All witnesses are sworn. The
exclusionary rule is invoked. Jessica Tapia testifies for the state. States exhibit A is marked, identified
as a picture of the victim, and received into evidence. Jario Guiterriez is sworn and testifies for the
state. States Exhibit B is marked, identified as his statement given to the police, and received in to
evidence. States Exhibit C is marked identified as a metal barbell, and received into evidence.
Detective Jim Dent testifies for the state. States Exhibit D is marked, identified as a statement from Alex
Espinoza, and is not offered into evidence, counsel object. The exhibit is not received into evidence.
Attorney Weiskopf asks for a continuance. Court is in recess. The court has had discussion in chambers
with counsel. There was a question by Mr. Weiskopf regarding the ruling the court had made. The court
indicated that it would not re-argue the issue. Mr. Weiskopf got upset repeating T v e had it" T v e had
it". The court does find Attorney Weiskopf s conduct was contemptable, but does not find him in
contempt. Detective Dent continues his testimony. States Exhibit E is marked, identified as a statement
from Javier Cisneros, and is admitted into evidence. States Exhibit F and G are marked as pictures of
the barbell, and are admitted into evidence.
Detective Tim Scott is sworn in and testifies for the
state. States Exhibit H is marked, identified as a statement given by Jeffery Ortega, and is received into
evidence. Attorney Sipes objects to the admission of Exhibit B - overuled. Shara Gooda testifies for the
state. Scott Peterson testifies for the state. John Zizumbo is sworn and testifies for the state. States
Exhibit I is marked, identified as daily logs of activity for Jeff Orgega from Weber Valley Detention
Center, and is received into evidence. Patrick Gooley is sworn and testifies for the state.
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that: This matter is continued to May 21,
2004 at 8:00 a.m. for furthercertification hearing. The above minor is continued in detention pending
said hearing.
Dated May 11, 2004
Failure to comply with the above order will result in your being found in contempt of court, the loss of your
Driver's License, and/or forfeiture of any or all of your Utah State Income Tax refund.
You have a right to appeal this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals. Appeals must be filed within 30jta;
from this date.

BY THE COURT

.j»fark Andres, JudgS ^ Ar ':j.
COPY TO: (x) PARENT(x)DT(x)LKE
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Addendum "C"

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF

RULING ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER
AND TO STAY SENTENCE

WEISKOPF, David

Case No.

444959

A person over 18 years of age.
David Weiskopf, by and through his attorney, D. Gilbert Athay, has moved the Court to
reconsider its contempt order and sentence in the above-entitled matter. Said motion is denied
for the following reasons:
Mr. Weiskopf alleges that the Court's oral statement on May 11th constituted a foil and
complete resolution of the matter before the Court, and therefore the matter was concluded and
was final, and that the Court's later findings should be barred by double jeopardy. A court's oral
statement does not become a final resolution of the matter unless and until it is reduced to writing
in a final order; furthermore, even the Court's oral statement on May 11th was that, although Mr.
Weiskopf s conduct was worthy of contempt, the Court was not making a finding of contempt
"at that time"; there was one final finding and order regarding the contempt.
Mr. Weiskopf asserts that the language of Utah Code Section 78-32-3 that contempt
committed in the immediate view and presence of the court "may be punished summarily"
requires the court to either punish the matter summarily or not at all. This is not the case. The
language "may be punished summarily" is clearly permissive; what the court can do summarily,
it can also do with deliberation. It is always preferable, when possible, for a court to have the
option to ponder and deliberate before making a decision, rather than being required to act in
haste; the permissive language of 78-32-3 is consistent with that principle.
Mr. Weiskopf contends that a contempt finding made pursuant to 78-32-3 must be done
according to the procedure outlined in 78-32-10. This is also not the case. Section 78-32-3
describes the procedure for a contempt committed in the immediate view and presence of the
court, while Sections 78-32-4 through 10 describe the procedure for a contempt not committed in
the immediate view and presence of the court. In the case at bar, the contempt was committed in
the immediate view and presence of the court, and was appropriately conducted pursuant to 7832-3. The fact that the Court set the sentencing over to another day and thereby gave Mr.
Weiskopf more time and notice than that to which he was entitled, changes neither the nature of
the contempt nor the procedure to be followed.

RULING CONTD:
WEISKOPF, David
JUNE 10, 2004
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There has been no showing of grounds for reversing the Court'sfindingof contempt, nor
for staying the execution of the sentence.
This Court's prior orders are continued in effect.
DATED TfflS 10* DAY OF JUNE, 2004.
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BY THE COURT

om*tA-.
J. Mjfrk Andrus, Judge
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